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Where Do Firms Manage Earnings? 
 
1. Introduction 
The study of earnings management dates back to at least Healy (1985).1 In the 
subsequent decades, researchers have conducted hundreds of studies of earnings management. 
Among other things, these studies have provided insights into when firms manage earnings, what 
types of accounts they manage, why they manage earnings, and how they manage earnings.2  
Surprisingly, however, there is a paucity of evidence about where firms manage earnings. Does 
earnings management generally take place in a firm’s foreign operations, far from headquarters 
and perhaps the scrutiny of auditors, or does it take place closer to home? This study provides 
initial evidence on the location of earnings management.   
Prior research has examined whether the location of a firm’s headquarters or location of 
incorporation is associated with measures of earnings management (e.g., Leuz et al. (2003)). In 
such studies, the broad research question is whether the institutions, customs, laws, and 
accounting standards in the firm’s parent location affect financial reporting. In our study, we take 
the next step to investigate this broad question, but we go inside the firm to examine whether the 
institutions and laws, including tax laws, in the locations of the firm’s subsidiaries (proxied by 
the World Bank ‘rule of law’ and tax haven status (including bank secrecy)) are associated with 
differences in earnings management in reported financial statements of the entire, consolidated 
company. Thus, the question is whether the institutional features of the subsidiaries affect 
financial reporting (via allowing or mitigating earnings management), despite the firm as a whole 
                                                 
1 Indeed, research on the related phenomenon of accounting method choice dates back to studies such as Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978), Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979), Bowen, Noreen, and Lacey (1981), and Holthausen (1981). 
2 For reviews see Healy and Whalen (1999), Schipper (1999), Dechow and Skinner (2000), Fields, Lys and Vincent 
(2001), and Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010). 
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being subject to U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations. 
We examine a sample of U.S.-based multinational firms from the years 1994 to 2009, 
constituting 11,077 firm-years. Our study focuses on multinational firms; therefore, we exclude 
purely domestic firms to avoid the trivial result that domestic firms by definition manage only 
domestic earnings. An important aspect of our sample is that GAAP and the regulatory 
environment is presumptively held constant at the firm level, in the sense that a U.S. listed firm 
is subject to U.S. GAAP and U.S. securities laws across its entire operations, whether domestic 
or foreign. Our first set of tests examines whether companies with a higher concentration of 
material subsidiaries (disclosed in exhibit 21 of the 10-K) in low rule of law locations or tax 
haven locations have more discretionary accruals. Our second set of tests is aimed at identifying 
whether earnings management occurs in foreign earnings or in domestic earnings by examining 
the mapping of foreign and domestic earnings into discretionary accruals. We also test the 
frequency of earnings restatements across the partitions of firms as an alternative measure of 
earnings management.     
We report three main findings. First, the data show that overall earnings are managed less 
when the firm has a high concentration of subsidiaries in foreign countries with a strong rule of 
law. This differential in earnings management for firms with subsidiaries in high rule of law 
countries is more pronounced in foreign income, consistent with the earnings management 
occurring in the foreign jurisdiction. Again, we are not comparing earnings management of 
foreign firms to U.S. firms – all the firms in the sample are U.S. domiciled firms and thus subject 
to U.S. laws and accounting standards. Thus, despite the firm being subject to U.S. GAAP and 
3 
 
SEC rules, the data are consistent with the geographic location of a U.S. firm’s foreign 
subsidiaries being associated with significant differences in earnings management.  
Second, we find that profitable firms with extensive tax haven subsidiaries engage in 
more earnings management, which is also concentrated in foreign earnings. This is not simply a 
manifestation of tax havens reducing the tax expense – we measure earnings management before 
taxes. Rather, we posit that tax havens are more desirable locations for earnings management 
because there is no local tax cost as a result of managing pre-tax income (and likely no U.S. tax 
cost because cash repatriations are not affected). For example, Erickson et al. (2004) find that 
firms engaging in fraudulent accounting incur actual tax costs when inflating their accounting 
earnings. They conjecture that firms can minimize the tax cost of such activities to the extent 
they can do so in a tax haven. In addition, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) observe that the same 
types of activities and structures that facilitate tax avoidance via tax havens can be used to  
facilitate managerial misappropriation. Our predictions are based on implications from these 
prior papers – earnings management can generate tax costs that can be avoided in tax havens, 
and the structures employed in tax haven subsidiaries provide obfuscation that aids earnings 
management activities. 
Finally, apart from the above results, earnings management appears to be more prevalent 
in domestic income than in foreign income. This is not a simple result of domestic operations 
being larger in scale than foreign operations; on average, foreign and domestic operations are of 
the same order of magnitude for the firms in our sample.   
We conduct a number of additional tests to examine the robustness of the results, 
including examining the absolute value of discretionary accruals, controlling for performance 
differences across firms, using different measures of rule of law and tax haven status, and using 
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restatements as the indication of earnings management instead of discretionary accruals. Across 
these tests the main results are generally consistent and in line with the above findings. One 
exception is that when examining restatements we do not find evidence that firms operating in 
tax havens are more likely to restate their financial statements. The evidence on rule of law 
continues to hold in the restatement sample as it did in the discretionary accruals tests.    
We contribute to the literature by examining a new aspect of earnings management – the 
role of the geographic footprint of a U.S. multinational’s subsidiaries. Specifically, we show that 
the previously documented effect that rule of law has on earnings management is actually much 
more pervasive. Not only does the rule of law in the parent company’s jurisdiction matter, but so 
does the rule of law in the jurisdictions of the firm’s subsidiaries. In addition, we show that 
subsidiary structures involving tax havens are associated with higher discretionary accruals for 
profitable firms. Finally, policymakers will find the results of this study interesting, particularly 
to the extent they have expressed concern about auditing and accounting in the foreign 
operations of U.S. multinationals and as they consider U.S. policies toward tax haven nations.   
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the prior literature with 
particular attention to research that provides a basis for our predictions about the geographical 
incidence of earnings management. In section 3, we develop our hypotheses. In section 4, we 
discuss our sample, variable measurement, and empirical tests. Section 5 presents our results, 
and section 6 concludes.   
2. Background and Prior Literature 
2.1.  The Regulation of Multinational Companies  
 
 Our inquiry focuses on U.S. multinationals and the management of earnings within the 
firm, i.e., where do multinationals manage earnings. Because our sample consists entirely of U.S. 
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SEC registrants, all the companies are required to apply U.S. GAAP to their financial statements 
regardless of where the underlying operations are located.3 In our sample, the top-level 
regulatory environment is held constant across our firms. What varies, however, are the local 
legal and regulatory environments of the countries in which foreign subsidiaries are located. 
 The ability of the U.S. to effectively exert regulatory control over the accounting in the 
foreign operations of U.S. multinationals has been a longstanding issue. For example, the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 aims to prevent U.S. companies and their agents 
from bribing foreign officials. The FCPA also contains important accounting provisions that 
require U.S. registrants to maintain a system of internal controls that provide reasonable 
assurance that, among other things, the transactions are properly recorded to permit preparation 
of financial statements in conformity with GAAP (Golden et al., 2006).  
 The PCAOB has also expressed concern with quality control in audits across borders. 
The then-acting chairman, Daniel L. Goelzer, in a recent speech stated the following concerns: 1) 
U.S. engagement partners sometimes do not have a sufficient basis on which to assess whether 
the non-U.S. audit personnel are qualified and familiar with U.S. GAAP, PCAOB standards, and 
SEC requirements, 2) internal inspection information about foreign-affiliate firms and personnel 
are sometimes not made available to the audit engagement partners and at times, engagement 
partners fail to even ask for it, 3) audit firms may not have minimum levels of training for 
GAAP, PCAOB standards, or SEC requirements for foreign-affiliate personnel, and 4) U.S. 
engagement teams sometimes fail to appropriately evaluate the results of a foreign affiliate’s 
                                                 
3 The subsidiary may also be required to prepare financial statements in accordance with local GAAP for a variety of 
reasons. Our point here is that when the earnings are consolidated and reported for the entire company, all the 
earnings are reported using GAAP and are subject to U.S. securities laws. 
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work, or fail to adequately supervise and control the affiliate’s work.4 Thus, while subsidiaries 
need to report their earnings following U.S. GAAP, the local institutions will vary at the 
locations of the subsidiaries and the knowledge of U.S. GAAP and securities laws may vary 
across personnel at the companies and at the audit firms.  
 To provide some examples of earnings management in foreign subsidiaries we look to 
cases of extreme earnings management resulting in fraud, which are detailed in SEC Accounting 
and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). For example, the SEC in AAER No. 2727 
accuses Bristow Group Inc. (a Delaware corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas) of 
improprieties at a foreign subsidiary. Specifically, Bristow’s wholly owned U.S. subsidiary, 
AirLog International, Ltd., through its Nigerian affiliate, Pan African Airlines Nigeria Ltd. 
(PAAN) made improper payments (bribes) totaling approximately $423,000 to employees of the 
governments of two Nigerian states. These improper payments, however, were not properly 
recorded in AirLog’s books and were never included in Bristow’s consolidated statements. 
Bristow’s internal controls failed to detect and prevent the improper payments. In another 
example, the SEC concluded that a Japanese subsidiary of Boston Scientific recorded false sales 
and materially overstated its earnings for several years in the 1990s, which then caused material 
misstatements in Boston Scientifics’ consolidated financial statements (AAER 1295).   
 In sum, there is concern by accounting regulators about foreign operations of U.S. 
multinationals, and there exist examples of extreme earnings management in foreign operations.  
However, there are also specific examples of earnings management involving domestic 
operations. What is lacking is large sample evidence about the geographic location of earnings 
management within firms and the factors that drive the location. There is, however, prior 
                                                 
4 December 7, 2009 speech before the AICPA National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments, 
Washington, DC. 
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research that informs our thinking of how the geographic incidence of earnings management 
within the firm might play out, and we turn to this research in the next section.    
2.2.  Prior Literature 
There is little prior research on where, within a multinational company, earnings are 
managed. Leuz et al. (2003), in an influential paper, examine earnings management around the 
world in a sample of over 8,000 firms from 31 countries and provide evidence of the importance 
of institutional features on accounting. For example, they provide evidence that earnings 
management is more likely to occur at companies that are located in countries where investor 
protection is weaker, reasoning that such protection prevents the extraction of private benefits by 
insiders and thus reduces the incentives to obfuscate information. However, Leuz et al. (2003) 
does not examine earnings management within the firm. In other words, Leuz et al. compare a 
U.S. domiciled company to a firm domiciled in Singapore, for example, but they do not compare 
the domestic earnings of a U.S. multinational to the foreign earnings of that same multinational 
company.  
Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) examine the geography of financial misreporting but their 
study is focused on the location of corporate headquarters relative to an SEC office. If corporate 
headquarters is in a county far from an SEC office and the local auditor office in the county is 
lax, companies in that county report a higher incidence of earnings decreasing restatements.  
Dyreng et al. (2010), Grullon et al. (2010), and McGuire et al. (2010) examine the effect of 
social norms on earnings management. These studies generally find that firms located in counties 
with high levels of religious adherence are less likely to engage in earnings management. While 
related and interesting, these papers examine differences in earnings management across firms 
and do not look at the location of the earnings management within the firm. 
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Other papers do examine the foreign earnings relative to the U.S. earnings of U.S. 
multinational corporations, but these papers do not examine the extent of manipulation of those 
earnings. More importantly, the studies do not investigate the effect of the institutional features 
of the location of the earnings on earnings properties. These papers are primarily concerned with 
the relative market valuation of the earnings. For example, Bodnar and Weintrop (1997) examine 
the relation between returns and domestic and foreign incomes and report that foreign earnings 
having a greater association with returns, consistent with the foreign earnings being related to 
growth opportunities reflected in returns. While these authors examine currency exchange rates 
and the timeliness of information related to foreign versus domestic operations, there is no 
investigation of differential earnings management in the foreign versus domestic earnings and no 
examination of cross-sectional variation in the foreign locations and the resulting effect on 
reported earnings.   
Another example is Thomas (1999), who examines whether abnormal returns can be 
earned using information about firms’ foreign versus domestic earnings. In a Mishkin (1983) 
framework, Thomas examines whether foreign earnings have different persistence than domestic 
earnings and whether trading profits can be earned via trading on the knowledge of such a 
difference. Thomas reports that foreign earnings have greater persistence than domestic earnings 
but that the market underestimates the persistence of foreign earnings, leading to predictable 
future returns. Hope et al. (2008) extend Thomas (1999) and report evidence consistent with 
investor mispricing of foreign earnings decreasing after the adoption of SFAS 131 Disclosures 
about Segments on Enterprise and Related Information. While these papers consider foreign 
versus domestic earnings, their focus is on mispricing, not where multinationals undertake 
earnings management. 
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Perhaps most closely related to our paper are two working papers: Durnev, et al. (2009) 
and Beuselinck et al. (2010). Durnev et al. (2009) examine governance at offshore financial 
centers and the effects on earnings management. The authors group together companies 
incorporated in an offshore financial center and U.S. domiciled firms that have affiliates in 
offshore financial centers as “offshore firms,” to which they compare other U.S. firms without 
offshore affiliates. The authors report evidence consistent with offshore firms engaging in more 
earnings management than non-offshore firms. Further, they document that companies with a 
higher Offshore Attitude Index, intended to measure the firm’s institutional and legal 
environment, manage earnings more with accruals than with real earnings management. Finally, 
the authors predict and find that earnings management of firms listed or cross-listed in the U.S. 
will be different from pure offshore firms and examine whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
significantly decreased accruals management of the listed and cross-listed firms. The authors 
find evidence consistent with their conjectures.  
The other concurrent working paper, Beuselinck et al. (2010), examines earnings 
management in European subsidiaries of EU-based multinational corporations. The authors find 
that earnings management is higher at the subsidiary level when the subsidiary-country 
institutional quality is weak. They also document evidence consistent with the MNC parent 
governance characteristics affecting the magnitude of subsidiary earnings management over and 
above subsidiary-specific characteristics. The authors conclude that the parent level 
characteristics have contagion effects for their subsidiary-level financial reporting quality.   
A final related working paper is Fan (2008), who examines whether earnings 
management is evident in foreign earnings of U.S. multinationals and whether the earnings 
management pattern changed after the adoption of SFAS 131. Fan uses the Burgstahler and 
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Dichev (1997) discontinuity in the distribution of earnings levels and earnings changes as the 
measure of earnings management. Fan reports evidence consistent with foreign earnings being 
managed to avoid a loss but not to avoid an earnings decrease. She also reports that domestic 
earnings are not managed to avoid a loss. She does not find a significant difference, on average, 
between the pre-and post-FAS 131 periods in loss avoidance behavior.  
In sum, there are a few related studies that have addressed aspects of our research 
question. However, the evidence, even when pieced together, is inconclusive. For example, 
Thomas (2000) documents that foreign earnings are more persistent than domestic earnings, 
while Fan (2008) documents that foreign earnings are used more often than domestic earnings to 
avoid a loss for U.S. multinationals. Neither of these studies examines the institutional forces at 
work at the various locations (e.g., in a tax haven or not, or in a location with a strong rule of law 
or not). In contrast, Leuz et al. (2003) focuses a great deal on the institutional forces but does not 
study earnings management within a multinational firm. Rather, Leuz et al. (2003) was an early 
and important study on the earnings quality of firms located in different countries operating 
under different standards, legal environments, and governance/shareholder protection regimes. 
Durnev et al. (2009) is closer to our study but focuses exclusively on offshore financial centers, 
combining multinational firms with affiliates in these centers with firms domiciled in these 
centers. Despite the advances made in understanding earnings management, it is not known 
whether U.S. multinational firms have more earnings management in domestic earnings, foreign 
earnings, or both, and whether such earnings management is affected by the local institutional 
regimes in which its foreign subsidiaries operate.5 
                                                 
5 Other tangentially related papers include Duru and Reeb (2002), who report evidence that analysts have lower 
forecast accuracy when firms have greater international diversification, and DeFond et al. (2007), who provide 
evidence that earnings announcements are more informative in countries with strong investor protections.   
11 
 
3.        Hypothesis Development 
 Earnings management can occur at the direction of central management or via the 
conduct of a division or subsidiary manager.6 In our setting, the predictions are the same in either 
case. For example, if central managers decide to engage in earnings management, they must 
decide whether to manage via domestic income, foreign income, or both.  Managers are expected 
to consider the expected costs of earnings management, including the likelihood of being 
challenged or discovered. In addition, managers will consider the potential benefits of earnings 
management such as higher compensation (Healy, 1985) or avoiding the violation of a debt 
covenant (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994; and Dichev and Skinner, 2002), for 
example. The expected likelihood of being caught may be lower for domestic earnings 
management, if directing earnings management in the foreign jurisdiction would involve more 
people or would involve people that do not have a close working relationship with top 
management. In other words, to the extent that top management wants to limit the number of 
people involved and keep the misreporting close to the parent company, earnings management 
will occur in domestic income. However, it is possible that foreign income will be managed 
more in order to avoid getting caught. For example, if the Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) result (that 
firms further from the SEC offices manage earnings more than firms close to SEC offices) can be 
generalized to U.S. subsidiaries relative to foreign subsidiaries, then more earnings management 
will take place in foreign jurisdictions. Because there are reasons for earnings management to be 
                                                 
6 In an analysis of fraudulent financial reporting over the period 1998 to 2007, the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) states, “The SEC named the CEO and/or CFO for some level 
of involvement in 89 percent of the fraud cases, up from 83 percent of cases in 1987-1997. Within two years of the 
completion of the SEC’s investigation, about 20 percent of CEOs/CFOs had been indicted and over 60 percent of 
those indicted were convicted” (COSO, 2010). Thus, many cases of financial manipulation name central managers 
as the guilty party. However, some cases are done by “rogue” managers, as the two SEC AAER cases in section 2 
indicate. Top management at Boston Scientific and Bristow did not appear to be, and were not accused of being, 
involved in the fraud.  
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located either more or less in foreign earnings than domestic earnings, we make no directional 
prediction with regards to the overall geographic location of earnings management.  
 Our first directional prediction (Hypothesis 1) focuses on the rule of law in the foreign 
countries where the firm’s subsidiaries are located. We predict that the local legal systems of the 
firm’s subsidiaries affect the firm’s propensity to engage in earnings management, such that 
having subsidiaries in weak rule of law countries will be associated with more earnings 
management. The effect of local institutions on accounting quality has been shown in prior 
literature, as discussed above (e.g., Leuz et al. (2003)). It is possible that earnings management in 
foreign operations is less likely to be challenged, and if so, the consequences are likely to be less 
stringent when there is a weak rule of law. Audits of foreign operations are typically performed 
by foreign affiliates of the auditor or, in some cases, by an unrelated foreign audit firm. If those 
audits are lacking the same rigor as the audit of the U.S. operations, as suggested is often the 
case by the PCAOB Chair as discussed above, then the managers might face less chance of being 
challenged if they manage foreign income, particularly so if the rigor of the local audit is 
affected by the local rule of law. The effect of local rule of law on earnings management, if any, 
is interesting when examining the earnings of subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals because the 
earnings of subsidiaries are required to be reported under U.S. GAAP and U.S. securities laws. 
The U.S. is considered to have a strong rule of law, which ideally should act as a constraint on 
earnings management in both domestic and foreign operations, in which case weaker constraints 
based on local law would not matter.   
 Our second directional prediction (Hypothesis 2) focuses on the role of tax havens in 
earnings management. We predict that having subsidiaries in tax havens is associated with more 
earnings management. This prediction comes in part from Erickson et al. (2004), which 
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examines whether firms engaging in accounting fraud pay taxes on the fraudulent earnings. 
Erickson et al. (2004: 391) do not study where firms managed the earnings or whether the taxes 
were foreign or domestic, but the authors conjecture that “the firm might overstate the income of 
a foreign subsidiary located in a low-tax country.” Managing earnings in a tax haven avoids cash 
tax payments and as well as the accounting income tax expense in most cases (see Erickson et al. 
(2004) for details). Another reason why we expect to see more earnings management for firms 
with tax haven subsidiaries comes from Desai, Dyck and Zingales (2007) and Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006). Those studies posit that the same structures and activities conducive to tax 
avoidance (i.e., complex structures and secrecy) are also conducive to private diversion of the 
firm’s resources by managers. Indeed, the authors argue that the primary intent of many tax 
shelters is to increase accounting earnings. Furthermore, in a report by the Joint Committee of 
Taxation (JCT) prepared for the Senate Finance Committee, the JCT noted that Enron created 
many entities in jurisdictions that did not impose a tax on such entities (e.g., tax havens). In 
particular, as of December 31, 2001, the Enron ownership structure included 441 entities formed 
in the Cayman Islands, a country that has never imposed a corporate income tax. These entities 
were used to route transactions, through which the company was able to increase earnings (e.g., 
LJM Cayman) without incurring additional taxes.  
 Of note is that our hypothesized prediction for tax havens is most applicable to profitable, 
tax-paying firms. Our prediction is that tax havens allow earnings management in a tax free 
manner, which implies that taxes are costly for the firm. As a result, in the tests that follow we 
estimate our regressions over the full sample and separately over a subsample of profitable firms 
(i.e., positive pre-tax domestic and foreign earnings).   
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 In addition, it is important to note that our prediction about earnings management in tax 
havens relates to management of pre-tax accounting income. The income and accruals measures 
that we examine are pre-tax and thus are not affected by reductions in tax expense. Also, the 
earnings management that we observe in our measures is not simply a manifestation of transfer 
pricing for tax purposes. Such tax-motivated income management involving tax havens typically 
involves shifting income across jurisdictions (e.g., U.S. to foreign) within the current year. While 
this can increase pre-tax foreign income and decrease pre-tax domestic income, it will not affect 
total consolidated pre-tax earnings. In contrast, accounting-motivated earnings management (i.e., 
management that would affect total earnings reported on the company’s annual SEC filing), 
involves shifting income over time (e.g., accruals that increase current year income and decrease 
next year’s income or real transactions accelerated into the current period).   
4.         Variables, Sample, and Descriptive Statistics  
4.1       Variables 
We examine two measures of discretionary accruals in our analyses, and later in the 
paper we examine restatements as well. The first is signed pre-tax discretionary accruals, 
PTDACC. The second is the absolute value of pre-tax discretionary accruals (|PTDACC|). The 
absolute value of discretionary accruals is useful as a dependent variable to capture both income-
increasing and income-decreasing earnings management when there is reason to expect both 
types of earnings management in a sample.7   
Note that data on foreign operations is extremely limited from public sources, especially 
following the implementation of SFAS 131, and thus direct tests of earnings management in 
                                                 
7 Studies examining the absolute value of discretionary accruals include Dechow and Dichev (2002), Frankel, 
Johnson, and Nelson (2002), Klein (2002), Chung and Kallapur (2003), Myers, Myers, and Omer (2003), Leuz, 
Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), and Bergstresser and Philippon (2006). As discussed later, we control for operating 
volatility in our analyses, following the recommendations of Hribar and Nichols (2007). 
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specific foreign locations are difficult. We employ company-wide measures of discretionary 
accruals and conduct an array of cross-sectional tests using the rule of law and tax haven location 
in order to investigate our research question.  
We measure discretionary accruals according to the modified Jones model, before taxes 
(Dechow et al., 1995). We expect tax haven usage to facilitate the management of pre-tax 
accounting income, because the earnings management will be tax-free. Thus, we exclude 
discretionary accruals that may arise from managing tax expense. Specifically, we start with pre-
tax accruals, PTACC, defined as pre-tax income (PI), less pre-tax cash flow, which is cash flow 
from operations (CFO), plus cash tax paid, less cash from extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations, all measured for the current year and scaled by total assets:8 
 𝑃𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 − (𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝑇𝑋𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋𝐼𝐷𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡). (1)  
 
Then, PTDACC (pre-tax discretionary accruals) is the estimated residual (𝜖?̂?𝑡) from the following 
model (estimated by 2-digit SIC and year): 
 𝑃𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 1𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2 (Δ𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 − Δ𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡)𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3 (𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡)𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡, 
 
(2)  
where ∆SALES is the change in sales from the prior year to the current year, ∆AR is the change in 
accounts receivable from the prior year to the current year, and PPE is gross property, plant and 
equipment at the end of the year. 
The explanatory variables of most interest are RULE OF LAW and HAVEN INTENSITY.  
RULE OF LAW is measured as the average rule of law of countries in which the firm discloses 
subsidiaries in Exhibit 21 of Form 10-K.The rule of law scores for each country are from the 
World Bank Governance Indicators dataset. RULE OF LAW will be high when the firm’s 
                                                 
8 Firm, time, and industry subscripts are omitted for expositional ease. 
16 
 
material subsidiaries are predominantly located in countries with a strong rule of law. RULE OF 
LAW captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.9 We predict that despite our 
sample firms being subject to U.S. GAAP and U.S. securities laws on their worldwide earnings, 
the local legal systems of their subsidiaries will affect their propensity to manage earnings, such 
that more earnings management takes place when the subsidiaries are located in countries with 
weak rule of law.  
HAVEN INTENSITY is measured as the number of subsidiaries located in tax haven 
countries, divided by the total number of subsidiaries. Data on subsidiaries are from Exhibit 21 
of the Form 10-K, where firms are required to list their subsidiaries with material operations.  
Tax havens are identified as countries that are on at least two of the four commonly used tax 
haven lists.10 While there is not an official definition of a tax haven, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) lists criteria to being labeled a tax haven 
including 1) imposing no or only nominal taxes, 2) a lack of transparency, 3) laws or 
administrative practices that prevent the effective exchange of information for tax purposes with 
other governments on taxpayers benefiting from the no or nominal taxation, and 4) an absence of 
a requirement that the activity be substantial.11 We expect a positive relation between HAVEN 
INTENSITY and the magnitude of discretionary accruals.   
We include variables to control for the general complexity of the firm, the scope of its 
foreign operations, and the macroeconomic conditions of the countries in which it has 
                                                 
9 See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/rl.pdf for a detailed discussion and listing of factors. 
10 We use the lists in Miedema (2008) as per Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). 
11 See http://www.oecd.org/document/23/0,3343,en_2649_33745_30575447_1_1_1_1,00.html for further details. 
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subsidiaries. We measure the extent to which the firm has special purpose entities, SPE 
INTENSITY, as the number of LLC, LP, and Trusts divided by the total number of subsidiaries 
on Exhibit 21. Prior research has used this approach to identify special purpose entities and 
shown that their use is associated with an increased propensity to disclose material weaknesses 
(Doyle, Ge, and McVay, 2007).12 We include two measures of the scope of foreign operations. 
The first, FOREIGNNESS, is foreign sales divided by total sales of the entire company. The 
second is the natural log of the number of countries in which the company has material 
subsidiaries, NCOUNTRIES. We include a measure of firm size, defined as the natural log of the 
firm’s assets, SIZE. We also include variables that reflect time-varying macroeconomic 
characteristics of the countries in which the firm operates. The first, CPI CHANGE SUB 
COUNTRIES, reflects the weighted average of the change in the consumer price index of the 
countries in which the firm operates. The second, GDP CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES, reflects the 
weighted average of the change in gross domestic product of the countries in which the firm 
operates. These two variables are gathered from the World Economic Outlook Database, April 
2010 edition, available from the International Monetary Fund. 
Finally, we include two variables to reflect the operating volatility of the firm. Hribar and 
Nichols (2007) suggest including these variables when using the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals as a dependent variable. We include the variables in our signed accruals tests as well for 
ease of comparability. SALES VOLATILITY is the rolling 5-year standard deviation of sales, from 
year t to t-4. CASH FLOW VOLATILITY is the rolling 5-year standard deviation of cash flow 
from operations (from the statement of cash flows), going from t to t-4. 
                                                 
12 This definition captures noncorporate entities, which may not all meet the technical definition of an SPE. We 
follow prior convention for labeling purposes but recognize that there is measurement error in this variable. 
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4.2       Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
Our sample selection criteria are described in Table 1. We begin with all U.S. 
incorporated firm-years listed on Compustat during the period 1994-2008, excluding only the 
smallest of firms (assets less than $1 million or lagged assets less than $1 million), firms in 
regulated industries, and those with missing values for pre-tax income, operating cash flow, cash 
taxes, change in sales, change in receivables, and gross property, plant and equipment. This gives 
us an initial sample of 78,448 firm-years. From these observations, we exclude firm-years that 
belong to industry-years with less than 10 observations. We calculate our modified measure of 
Jones model discretionary accruals using this slightly reduced sample of 69,819 firm-years. To 
investigate the incidence of earnings management in domestic and foreign income, we need 
companies to have foreign income. When we require firm-years to have non-missing values for 
pre-tax domestic and foreign income, we obtain 32,734 firm-years. Finally, we require non-
missing data to compute the independent variables in the study. Many of these variables, which 
are described below, are based on data from Exhibit 21 of the 10-K, where firms are required to 
list their material subsidiaries. As stated above, we use these data to compute measures of tax 
haven intensity, rule of law, and special purpose entity intensity. After applying these screens, 
the main sample used in our tests has 11,077 firm-years from 2,067 firms. 
Table 2 presents the breakdown of the sample across the Fama-French 30 industries.13  
The sample is well spread over industries, with no industry accounting for more than 22 percent 
of the firms. Most industries account for 1 to 5 percent of the firms. Relative to the Compustat 
population, our sample appears to over-represent some industries and under-represent others. 
The biggest deviation is in the Business Equipment industry, which accounts for 21 percent of 
                                                 
13 The financials and utilities industries are dropped because we eliminate regulated industries from the sample. Of 
the 14 firms in Compustat in the tobacco industry, none fulfill all of our sample criteria. Thus, we include a 
breakdown of 27 (not 30) industries in Table 2. 
19 
 
our sample, but only 13 percent of the Compustat sample. Other deviations are smaller. 
Descriptive statistics for the main variables in the study are presented in Table 3. Pre-tax 
discretionary accruals have a mean (median) of 0.003 (0.011) in the sample.14 The absolute value 
of pre-tax discretionary accruals has a mean (median) of 0.064 (0.041).  This is smaller than the 
0.101 mean absolute value of discretionary accruals in Hribar and Nichols (2007), but this is to 
be expected since our sample includes only multinational firms and Hribar and Nichols (2007) 
show that larger firms have smaller absolute value of discretionary accruals. As the sample 
consists of multinationals, foreign operations are a substantial part of the firms in the sample. 
The mean pre-tax domestic income is 0.026 in the sample, which is slightly smaller than the 
mean pre-tax foreign income of 0.028. The median firm still has more domestic income, 
however, with median pre-tax domestic income of 0.036 compared to median foreign pre-tax 
income of 0.019.   
RULE OF LAW has a mean (median) value of 1.065 (1.087). The raw Rule of Law 
measure from the World Bank is designed so that it is mean zero, with a standard deviation of 
one across all countries in a given year. Thus, the firms in the sample tend to have most of their 
subsidiaries in high rule of law countries. There is a substantial use of tax haven subsidiaries in 
the sample, consistent with widespread use of tax haven subsidiaries among multinational firms 
in general. The variable HAVEN INTENSTIY has a mean (median) of 0.177 (0.146), indicating 
that 17.7 percent of the average firm’s material foreign subsidiaries are located in tax havens. 
Most firms in the sample do not report special purpose entities (at least among their material 
subsidiaries), with a median SPE INTENSITY of zero in the sample, and a mean of 0.058. The 
mean (median) value of 0.381 (0.358) for FOREIGNNESS (foreign sales from Compustat 
                                                 
14 The mean is not zero because the model is estimated over the larger 69,819 firm-year sample, which is prior to 
imposing other data requirements to arrive at the final sample. 
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geographic segment data divided by total sales from Compustat) indicates that a large percentage 
of sales of the firms in the sample are earned in foreign jurisdictions. CASH FLOW VOLATILITY 
and SALES VOLATILITY have mean values of 0.062 and 0.232, respectively. NCOUNTRIES has 
a mean (median) value of 2.348 (2.398), and since it is the natural log of the number of countries 
in which the firm reports material subsidiaries, indicates that the mean firm has material 
subsidiaries in approximately 10 countries. The natural log of the firms’ assets, SIZE, has a mean 
(median) value of 6.716 (6.676). The variable CPI CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES, the measure of 
the average rate of inflation in countries in which the sample firms have subsidiaries, has a mean 
(median) of 5.205 (3.003). The variable GDP CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES, a measure of the 
average change in gross domestic product in the countries in which the sample firms have 
subsidiaries, has a mean (median) of 3.444 (3.494).  
Table 4 reports the correlations among these variables. The Pearson correlations are in 
the upper right and the Spearman correlations are in the lower left. Consistent with Hribar and 
Nichols (2007) we find positive correlations between the absolute value of (in our case pre-tax) 
discretionary accruals and the volatility of cash flows and sales and a negative correlation with 
firm size. The number of countries in which the firm lists material subsidiaries is also negatively 
correlated with the absolute value of pre-tax discretionary accruals. We next turn to the 
multivariate tests. 
5.         Empirical Tests and Results 
5.1      Foreign Subsidiaries and Discretionary Accruals    
Our first set of analyses examine whether foreign subsidiary characteristics are associated 
with discretionary accruals. Three models with different combinations of explanatory variables 
are estimated, with the full model as follows: 
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𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸 𝑂𝐹 𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼2𝐻𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑁 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡+  �𝛼𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡. (3)  
 
The results are presented in Table 5, Panel A.15 In the first column, we present the results 
with RULE OF LAW and control variables, but excluding HAVEN INTENSITY. In the second 
model, we present results with HAVEN INTENSITY, but not RULE OF LAW. The full model 
with all of the explanatory variables is presented in the rightmost column labeled “Model 3.” 
RULE OF LAW is negative and significant in both specifications where it appears (-0.687 in 
Model 1; -0.688 in Model 3). This is consistent with the prediction that firms with subsidiaries 
located in strong rule of law countries manage their earnings less than firms with subsidiaries 
located in weak rule of law countries. HAVEN INTENSITY is not significantly different from 
zero in Model 2 or in Model 3. A positive coefficient would be consistent with the prediction that 
firms with more subsidiaries located in tax havens have more earnings management, as proxied 
by discretionary accruals.    
The analysis in Panel A includes all observations regardless of whether they are 
profitable firms or loss firms. However, there is evidence that discretionary accruals can be 
asymmetric with respect to losses (Ball and Shivakumar, 2006). Moreover, as stated above, our 
hypothesis about earnings management being concentrated in tax havens presumes that firms are 
profitable, tax-paying firms. Loss firms are unlikely to face significant tax costs from earnings 
management in the first place, and thus are less likely to focus their earnings management in tax 
havens. Accordingly, in Panel B of Table 5 we re-estimate equation (3) over the set of firm-years 
                                                 
15 We utilize robust regression to control for outliers. In the regressions, all continuous variables are mean centered 
at zero for ease of interpretation of the interaction effects (Aiken and West, 1991). We multiply the dependent 
variable by 100 to facilitate interpretation of the coefficients as percentages. The standard errors in all regressions 
are computed after clustering observations by firm and year to mitigate the effects of cross-sectional and intra-firm 
correlation in the residuals (Petersen, 2009). For all regressions we present one-tailed p-values for t-statistics where 
we have a prediction and two-tailed p-values otherwise. 
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that have positive pre-tax foreign and positive pre-tax domestic income. The results in Panel B 
indicate that among profitable firms, earnings management is increasing in the extent to which 
the firms have tax haven subsidiaries. The coefficient on HAVEN INTENSITY is positive and 
significant in both specifications where it is included, ranging from 0.828 in column (2) to 0.836 
in column (3). As in the broad sample of firms, RULE OF LAW is negative and significant, as 
predicted, in each specification where it is included. 
In terms of the control variables, the results in Table 5 show a consistently positive 
coefficient on FOREIGNNESS and a consistently negative coefficient on SIZE. Coefficients on 
CASH FLOW VOLATILITY are significantly negative across all specifications. These findings 
are consistent with the modified Jones model better explaining accruals, and thus leaving less to 
be labeled discretionary, for large firms and firms with low operating volatility (Hribar and 
Nichols, 2007). We also find consistently negative coefficients on CPI CHANGE SUB 
COUNTRIES and GDP CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES. We have no directional prediction for 
these variables, but include them to control for macroeconomic conditions in the countries in 
which the firm operates.   
To graphically illustrate the effect of RULE OF LAW and HAVEN INTENSITY on 
PTDACC, we replace the continuous variables RULE OF LAW and HAVEN INTENSITY in Panel 
B of Table 5 with indicator variables that capture quintiles of RULE OF LAW and HAVEN 
INTENSITY. The coefficient values for each of the quintiles are then plotted in Figure 1. As the 
figure shows, the effect of RULE OF LAW on PTDACC is greatest when moving from the first to 
second quintile, and then continues to strengthen through the fifth quintile. The effect of HAVEN 
INTENSITY on PTDACC appears to be greatest when moving from the second to third quintile of 
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HAVEN INTENSITY, and again from the fourth to fifth quintiles, with the largest effect 
concentrated in the quintile containing the most haven intense firms. 
5.2  Discretionary Accruals on Foreign and Domestic Pre-tax Income   
In Table 6 we examine the mapping of foreign and domestic pre-tax income into 
discretionary accruals. The idea is to examine how earnings management can be attributed to 
domestic versus foreign activity by directly including measures of such activity. Since U.S. firms 
are required to disclose the breakdown of their pre-tax income into pre-tax domestic and pre-tax 
foreign income, those data are available for a broad sample.16 First, we define the rate of 
company-wide discretionary accruals as: 
 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 . (4)  
 
This ratio captures the fraction of total pre-tax income that is estimated to be discretionary 
accrual income. Re-arranging the terms, and letting 𝛿𝑖𝑡 represent the rate of pre-tax discretionary 
accruals, we obtain: 
 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖𝑡𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡. (5)  
 
In this study, we ask where earnings are managed. One way to provide evidence on this question 
is to test whether the discretionary accrual rate on domestic income is different from the 
discretionary accrual rate on foreign income. That is, we would like to know if 𝛿𝑖𝑡 is the same 
when pre-tax income is derived from domestic sources as when it is derived from foreign 
sources. To test this, we can modify Equation (5) as follows: 
 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡, (6)  
 
                                                 
16 The breakdown of pre-tax income into pre-tax domestic income and pre-tax foreign income is a required 
disclosure under U.S. GAAP found in the tax footnote of firm’s financial statements to correspond with the 
breakdown of tax expense into domestic and foreign components. 
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where 𝛼𝑖𝑡 represents the rate at which domestic pre-tax income maps into discretionary accruals, 
and 𝛽𝑖𝑡 represents the rate at which foreign pre-tax income maps into discretionary accruals.   
Empirical implementation requires dropping the subscripts i and t on the coefficients 𝛼 and 𝛽 
and the inclusion of an error term. We also include an intercept for completeness. Thus, we 
estimate an OLS regression of the following form: 
 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝛼𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡. (7)  
 
Our first test, for which we have no directional prediction, is whether  𝛼 = 𝛽, or in 
words, whether there is a difference between the rate at which 𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀 and 𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂 map into 
𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶. We are also interested in the cross sectional determinants of 𝛼 and 𝛽. In particular, we 
hypothesize that 𝛽 is a function of the rule of law of the foreign countries in which the firm 
operates material subsidiaries, and that 𝛽 may also be a function of whether or not the firm 
operates in tax havens.). We can extend Equation (6) to facilitate these hypotheses as follows: 
 
 
𝛼𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸 𝑂𝐹 𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋2𝐻𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑁 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡+ � 𝜋𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑘 ,
𝑘
 
 
(8)  
and 
 
 
𝛽𝑖𝑡 = 𝜔0 + 𝜔1𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸 𝑂𝐹 𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔2𝐻𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑁 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡+ � 𝜔𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑘 .
𝑘
 (9)  
 
Substituting equation (8) and equation (9) into equation (6) gives the following: 
 
 
𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋0𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋1𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸 𝑂𝐹 𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋2𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝐻𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑁 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜋𝑘𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑘 + 𝜔0𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 +
𝜔1𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸 𝑂𝐹 𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔2𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑁 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 +
∑ 𝜔𝑘𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑘 . 
(10)  
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To empirically estimate equation (10), we also add an intercept and an error term:  
 
 
𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝜋0𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋1𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸 𝑂𝐹 𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 +
𝜋2𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑁 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜋𝑘𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑘 +
𝜔0𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔1𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸 𝑂𝐹 𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔2𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝐻𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑁 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜔𝑘𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑘 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡. 
 
(11)  
Hypothesis 1 predicts that firms with subsidiaries in countries with a high rule of law will 
have less earnings management in foreign earnings. That is, Hypothesis 1 predicts that 𝜔1 < 0. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that firms with subsidiaries in tax haven countries will have more earnings 
management in foreign earnings. That is, Hypothesis 2 predicts that 𝜔2 > 0. 
Table 6 presents estimates of Equation (11), with Panel A estimated over all firm-years 
and Panel B estimated over firm-years with positive pre-tax foreign and positive pre-tax 
domestic income. In Panel A of Table 6, Model 1 examines how discretionary accruals are 
explained by pre-tax domestic income and pre-tax foreign income without control variables. The 
coefficients on both PIDOM and PIFO are positive and significant, with values of 22.031 and 
14.817, respectively. The coefficient on PIDOM is significantly greater than the coefficient on 
PIFO, as indicated by F-statistic in the bottom row of the table. The interpretation is that, at the 
mean, a dollar of pre-tax domestic income results in approximately 22 cents of pre-tax 
discretionary accruals, whereas a dollar of pre-tax foreign income results in approximately 15 
cents of pre-tax discretionary accruals. Dollar-for-dollar, this is consistent with domestic income 
being subject to more earnings management than foreign income.  
The results for Model 2 include the control variables from Table 5: SPE INTENSITY, 
FOREIGNNESS, NCOUNTRIES, SIZE, CPI CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES, GDP CHANGE SUB 
COUNTRIES, SALES VOLATILITY, and CASH FLOW VOLATILITY. For the sake of brevity the 
coefficients on those variables are not reported in Table 6 and their presence is instead noted by a 
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“YES” in the row labeled “CONTROLS.” Notice, however, that the control variables result in a 
large increase in explanatory power from an R2 of approximately 21 percent in Model 1 to 
approximately 31 percent in Model 2. With the controls included, both PIDOM and PIFO remain 
positive and significant (27.278, and 19.078, respectively). 
In Models 3 and 4, we interact PIDOM and PIFO with RULE OF LAW and HAVEN 
INTENSITY. We expect the effects of rule of law to be concentrated in pre-tax foreign income. 
Accordingly, we predict a negative coefficient on the interaction of PIFO and RULE OF LAW. 
We also allow RULE OF LAW to interact with PIDOM for the sake of completeness, but we 
make no prediction on its sign. Model 3 reveals that the coefficient on PIFO*RULE OF LAW is 
negative and significant, as predicted (-20.788).  This is consistent with pre-tax foreign income 
being subject to more (less) earnings management when the firm’s foreign operations are in 
countries with relatively weak (strong) rule of law. 
To facilitate interpretation of the interaction terms, all variables have been mean centered. 
Thus, for the mean firm in Model 3, 18.8 cents of each foreign pre-tax dollar maps into a dollar 
of pre-tax discretionary accruals. A one standard deviation increase in RULE OF LAW is 
associated with a 10.1 cent per dollar lower rate at which pre-tax foreign income maps into 
discretionary accruals.17 The coefficient on the interaction of RULE OF LAW and PIDOM is also 
significant, but the effect is much smaller economically. A one standard deviation increase in 
RULE OF LAW is associated with a four cent per dollar lower rate at which pre-tax domestic 
income maps into discretionary accruals. 
Model 4 includes the interaction of PIDOM and PIFO with HAVEN INTENSITY. As with 
RULE OF LAW, we expect that the effects of HAVEN INTENSITY will be concentrated in 
foreign income. We make no prediction for the interaction of HAVEN INTENSITY and domestic 
                                                 
17Calculated as -20.768*0.487 = 10.1. 
27 
 
income. In this specification, the coefficient on PIFO*HAVEN INTENSITY is insignificant. 
However, because our prediction for HAVEN INTENSITY is most applicable for profitable firms, 
the interpretation for the full sample is less of a concern. In Model 5 we include all of the 
interactions at the same time. Consistent with the results in Models 1-4, the coefficient on 
PIFO*RULE OF LAW is negative and significant (-20.872) but the coefficient on PIFO*HAVEN 
INTENSITY remains insignificant. The main effects of both PIDOM and PIFO remain positive 
and significant with values 27.758 and 18.867, respectively. 
 In Table 6, Panel B, we re-estimate the regressions in Panel A, except we use only the 
subsample of firms that have positive pre-tax domestic income and positive pre-tax foreign 
income. As in the Table 5 analysis, we include this test because of evidence that discretionary 
accruals can be asymmetric with respect to losses (Ball and Shivakumar, 2006) and because our 
prediction for HAVEN INTENSITY is most applicable for profitable (tax-paying) firms. Model 1 
examines how discretionary accruals are explained by pre-tax domestic income and pre-tax 
foreign income without control variables. The coefficients on both PIDOM and PIFO are 
positive and significant, with values of 5.517 and 4.984, respectively. In Model 2 we include the 
control variables SPE INTENSITY, FOREIGNNESS, NCOUNTRIES, SIZE, CPI CHANGE SUB 
COUNTRIES, GDP CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES, SALES VOLATILITY, and CASH FLOW 
VOLATILITY. The controls increase the explanatory power of the model and cause the 
coefficients on both PIDOM and PIFO to increase to 13.060 and 8.197.     
 Models 3 and 4 consider the effects of interacting PIDOM and PIFO with RULE OF 
LAW and HAVEN INTENSITY, respectively. We continue to find a negative coefficient on the 
interaction of PIFO with RULE OF LAW. In contrast to Panel A of Table 6, the coefficient on 
PIFO*HAVEN INTENSITY is positive and significant as predicted in both Models 4 and 5, 
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whereas it was insignificant in Panel A. This indicates that among profitable firms, earnings 
management of foreign income is increasing in the extent of subsidiaries in tax haven locations. 
To graphically illustrate the effect of RULE OF LAW and HAVEN INTENSITY on the 
mapping of PIFO into PTDACC, we re-estimate the model but replace the continuous variables 
RULE OF LAW and HAVEN INTENSITY with indicator variables that capture quintiles of RULE 
OF LAW and HAVEN INTENSITY. The coefficient value for each of the quintiles is then plotted 
in Figure 2. As the figure shows, the effect of RULE OF LAW is greatest when moving from the 
first to second quintile, and then continues to strengthen through the fifth quintile. Similarly, the 
effect of HAVEN INTENSITY is greatest when moving from the first to second quintile of 
HAVEN INTENSITY, and increasing thereafter, with the largest effect concentrated in the quintile 
containing the most haven-intense firms. 
 5.3      Additional Tests 
5.3.1.  Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals 
 To examine the robustness of the results, we perform a number of additional tests. In this 
subsection, we change the dependent variable to the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
(|PTDACC|), to capture both income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management.18 
Table 7 is the analog to Panel A of Table 5, but with the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
as the dependent variable.  As in the earlier analysis, RULE OF LAW is negatively associated 
with earnings management, with coefficients of -0.306 in both Model 1 and Model 3. This 
indicates that firms with subsidiaries in high rule of law countries engage in less earnings 
management than firms with subsidiaries in low rule of law countries. Unlike Table 5 Panel A, 
the coefficient on HAVEN INTENSITY is positive and significant, as predicted, with a value of 
                                                 
18 Many studies use the absolute value of discretionary accruals, including Dechow and Dichev (2002), Frankel, 
Johnson, and Nelson (2002), Klein (2002), Chung and Kallapur (2003), Myers, Myers, and Omer (2003), Leuz, 
Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), and Bergstresser and Philippon (2006).   
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0.649 in both Models 2 and 3. We cannot fully explain the economic drivers of a positive 
relation with the absolute value of discretionary accruals but no relation with signed 
discretionary accruals. The coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent between 
Table 7 and Table 5, Panel A in terms of sign and significance. The exceptions are the volatility 
controls. SALES VOLATILITY was insignificant in Table 5 but is positive and significant in 
Table 7. CASH FLOW VOLATILITY was negative in Table 5 but is positive in the Table 7 
analysis of absolute value of discretionary accruals. Based on Hribar and Nichols (2007), we 
expect a positive coefficient on both volatility controls in Table 7, where we are explaining the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals. 
 Table 8 is the analog to Panel A of Table 6 but with the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals as the dependent variable. The analysis examines how RULE OF LAW and HAVEN 
INTENSITY affect the mapping of the absolute value of foreign pre-tax income into the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals. Model 1 of Table 8 reveals that the coefficients on both |PIDOM| 
and |PIFO| are positive and significant, with values of 8.913 and 4.215, respectively. The 
coefficient on |PIDOM| is significantly greater than the coefficient on |PIFO|, as indicated by the 
bottom row of the table. Model 2 includes the control variables from Table 6. As in Table 6, the 
R2 of the models increase substantially with the addition of the control variables. With the 
controls included, both PIDOM and PIFO remain positive and significant. 
In Models 3 and 4, we interact |PIDOM| and |PIFO| with RULE OF LAW, HAVEN 
INTENSITY, and SPE INTENSITY. As indicated earlier, we expect the effects of foreign rule of 
law to be concentrated in pre-tax foreign income. Accordingly, we predict a negative coefficient 
on the interaction of |PIFO| and RULE OF LAW. Model 3 reveals that the coefficient on 
|PIFO|*RULE OF LAW is negative and significant, as predicted, at -5.956. This is consistent 
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with pre-tax foreign income being subject to more (less) earnings management when the firm’s 
foreign operations are in countries with relatively weak (strong) rule of law. A one standard 
deviation increase in RULE OF LAW is associated with a 2.9 cent per dollar lower rate at which 
pre-tax foreign income maps into discretionary accruals. In contrast to the effect of RULE OF 
LAW on management of foreign income, the coefficient on the interaction of RULE OF LAW and 
|PIDOM| is insignificant, consistent with the rule of law of the firm’s foreign operations having 
little or no effect on the firm’s management of domestic income. 
Model 4 includes the interaction of |PIDOM| and |PIFO| with HAVEN INTENSITY. As 
predicted, the coefficient on |PIFO|*HAVEN INTENSITY is positive and significant (10.759), 
consistent with firms with extensive tax haven subsidiaries engaging in more earnings 
management of their foreign pre-tax income. A one standard deviation increase in HAVEN 
INTENSITY is associated with additional discretionary accruals of 1.9 cents per dollar of pre-tax 
foreign income.  
 In Model 5 we include all of the interactions at the same time. Consistent with the results 
in Models 1-4, the coefficient on |PIFO|*RULE OF LAW is negative and significant (-7.090) and 
the coefficient on |PIFO|*HAVEN INTENSITY is positive and significant (13.998). The main 
effects of both |PIDOM| and |PIFO| remain positive and significant with values 7.853 and 4.309, 
respectively. Thus, across the tests with the absolute value of discretionary accruals as the 
dependent variable, the results suggest that earnings management of foreign income is 
decreasing in the rule of law of the firm’s foreign subsidiaries, and increasing in the tax haven 
intensity of its foreign subsidiaries. Apart from those results, domestic income appears to be 
managed more than foreign income.    
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5.3.2.    Additional Control Variables 
 In this subsection, we include additional control variables in the regressions specified in 
Equation (3) and Equation (11). Specifically, in untabulated results, we also include the 
following control variables: firm age, leverage, the market to book ratio, the market value of 
equity, a proxy for capital intensity, a proxy for intangible intensity, and a variable that captures 
the fraction of loss years over the firm’s past ten fiscal years. These variables are drawn from 
prior research that uses similar dependent variables (e.g. Hribar and Nichols, 2007; Francis et al., 
2005). Results remain statistically and economically similar with the inclusion of these variables. 
We also find that the inclusion of two-digit SIC code fixed effects does not alter our findings 
materially. 
5.3.3.   Controlling for Performance 
 Kothari et al. (2007) describes how performance matching can improve modified 
discretionary accruals models by controlling for extreme performance that makes estimation of 
discretionary accruals difficult. Dechow et al. (2011) presents a new method of improving the 
modified Jones model based on researcher-predicted timing of accrual reversals. Both of these 
adjustments are only improvements to the model under certain conditions. For performance 
matching, if performance is correlated with earnings management, the power of the model is 
actually reduced as it throws the proverbial baby out with the bathwater. For the Dechow et al. 
(2011) model, the modified Jones model’s ability to detect discretionary accruals is only 
improved if the researcher has an ex ante prediction of when the managed accruals will reverse.   
 We control for performance by adding return-on-assets to our regression models in 
untabulated tests. The results are qualitatively the same for our test variables and the inferences 
remain the same, except for the coefficient on HAVEN INTENSITY in Table 5, Panel B, which 
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becomes insignificant. We do not have predictions about when managed accruals will reverse in 
our setting and thus do not test for reversals in our analyses. 
5.3.4.    Alternative Measures of Rule of Law and Haven Intensity 
 We test the robustness of our results to different definitions of our main variables. First, 
we replace HAVEN INTENSITY throughout the study with the natural log of the number of tax 
haven countries in which the firm operates, and find similar results. Second, we replace RULE of 
LAW throughout the study with a variable that counts the number of “corrupt” countries in which 
the firm operates, and we find that firms in more corrupt countries engage in more foreign 
earnings management.19 In sum, results do not appear to be highly dependent on specific 
definitions of tax haven intensity or rule of law. 
5.3.5.     Restatements  
  In further robustness tests, we replace pre-tax discretionary accruals from Equation (3) 
with a binary variable that equals one if the firm restated its financial statements for that year. 
Compared to discretionary accruals, restatements have the advantage that they are independent 
of the researcher, as they are not based on a researcher-generated model of accruals. However, 
restatements have two main disadvantages. First, restatements will not capture within-GAAP 
earnings management. Second, and most importantly, for a restatement to occur the GAAP 
violation must be discovered. Thus, the most successful earnings management may never result 
in a restatement, either because it was within GAAP to begin with or because it was well hidden 
and never discovered. Since variation in the risk of detection across foreign operations is at the 
heart of this paper’s hypotheses, restatements are less than ideal for this paper (the same would 
hold true for SEC AAERs).  
                                                 
19 A corrupt country was defined to be any country in the most corrupt quartile of the World Bank’s Corruption 
Index. 
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 Because the dependent variable is an indicator variable, we estimate the model with 
logistic regression. We include a number of additional controls that have been used in prior 
research examining accounting restatements and fraud.20 Restatements are gathered from the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), and cover the years 1995-2005. The new data 
requirements (the restatement variable plus the additional controls) reduce the sample size to 
6,699 firm-years, of which 269 are restatement firm-years. 
 In Table 9, we report results from the logistic regression. Consistent with our predictions, 
we find that increases in RULE OF LAW significantly reduce the likelihood of a restatement. The 
unconditional probability of restatement in our sample given the explanatory variables is about 
four percent. A one standard deviation improvement in RULE OF LAW decreases the probability 
of a restatement by 0.9 percent to 3.1 percent. On the other hand, we find no evidence that 
HAVEN INTENSITY is associated with restatements.  
 Current research suggests that propensity score matching can improve the reliability of 
results in observational studies (Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker, 2010). Accordingly, we re-
estimate the restatement tests using a propensity score matching approach, as follows. Among 
firm-years that have restatement data, we keep only those observations in the lowest quintile of 
RULE OF LAW or the highest two quintiles of RULE OF LAW. Firm-years that are in the lowest 
quintile of RULE OF LAW are assigned to the “treatment” group, and firm-years that are in the 
highest two quintiles of RULE OF LAW are assigned to the potential “control” group. We then fit 
a logistic regression predicting the treatment as a function of the control variables from Table 5.  
We use the predicted probability of receiving the treatment to match treatment firm-years to 
                                                 
20 The additional control variables include: change in receivables, change in inventory, change in cash sales, change 
in return on assets, change in the number of employees, the level of “soft” assets, an indicator for whether the firm 
issued debt or equity in the period, an indicator for whether the firm has outstanding leases, a measure of ex-ante 
financing needs, Altman’s Z, and industry fixed effects. See Dechow et al., 2011 for detailed definitions of these 
variables. 
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control firm-years. Once treatment and control firm-years are matched, we compare the 
frequency of observed restatements across the two groups.21 Results are presented in Table 10, 
Panel A. Of the 1,062 firm-years with subsidiaries in relatively strong RULE OF LAW countries, 
we find that 12 resulted in restated earnings. Of the 1,062 firm-years with subsidiaries in 
relatively weak RULE OF LAW countries, we find that 57 resulted in restated earnings. The 
difference is highly significant. This finding is consistent with the finding in Table 9 that firms 
with subsidiaries in countries with a weak rule of law are more likely to restate earnings. 
 In Table 10, Panel B, we examine the effectiveness of the matches. With each variable, 
we present two rows – the top row presents the mean of the variable for the treatment and control 
groups prior to the match (labeled “pre-match”) and the second row presents the mean of the 
variable for the treatment and control groups after the match is made. We see substantial 
tightening of the control variables across the two groups post-match relative to pre-match, 
though many of the variables remain significant. This suggests that the matches were effective, 
though not perfect in eliminating the effects of the covariates. 
 In Table 11, we repeat the exercise, but for HAVEN INTENSITY. Unlike the tests in Table 
10, we find no evidence that firms with more intense tax haven usage are more likely to restate 
financial statements. Again, this is consistent with the logistic regression results in Table 9. 
Overall, the tests on the restatement sample indicate that having subsidiaries in weak rule of law 
countries is associated with a higher likelihood of restatement, whereas having subsidiaries in tax 
havens is not associated with the likelihood of restatement.   
                                                 
21 Not every treatment firm will match with a control firm, and the propensity score approach involves a trade-off.  
If the matching process is relaxed so that more firms match, then the resulting matches will be less precise.  
Conversely, if the matching is required to be very precise, then there will be fewer successful matches. 
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6.    Conclusions 
We examine the location of earnings management across domestic and foreign income 
for a sample of 2,067 U.S. multinational firms (11,077 firm-years) over the years 1994-2009. We 
report three main findings. First, we find that domestic income tends to be managed more than 
foreign income, on average. Second, we predict and find that firms with extensive foreign 
subsidiaries in countries with a low rule of law engage in more earnings management than other 
firms, and the earnings management is concentrated in foreign income. Third, we find that 
profitable firms with a relatively high proportion of subsidiaries in tax havens manage earnings 
more than other firms, as measured by discretionary accruals, and that the incremental effect is 
also concentrated in foreign income. Together, these results provide initial evidence about where 
firms manage earnings. 
All studies are subject to certain caveats, and this study is no exception. In an ideal 
experiment we could assign firms randomly to do business in different locals, with varying levels 
of rule of law and taxation, and then observe how their earnings management changed with the 
footprint of their operations around the world. Like most archival research we do not have the 
luxury of random assignment, and thus we have the limitations that come with observing data as 
they naturally occur.    
This paper contributes to the long line of research on earnings management by providing 
initial evidence on where firms manage earnings, a question that is for the most part unexplored.  
In addition, our study is an early step in the literature focused on looking within multinational 
firms rather than only across firms.  We look forward to further inquiries in the future.  
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
 
 
 
Notes:  This table explains the sample selection criteria used in the study.  Variables referred to above are 
defined in Table 3 and in Section 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Criteria Firms Firm-years
U.S. Corporations covered by Compustat between 1994 and 2009 
with total assets greater than $1 million and non-missing values 
of the following variables: OANCF, TXPD, SALE, RECCH, PPEGT, 
and PI 10,710 78,448
With data necessary to compute Jones Model Accruals (including 
lagged assets for the scaler, and 10 industry-year observations to 
estimate the equation 10,412 69,819
With non-missing values of PIDOM and PIFO 6,832 32,734
With non-missing values of Rule of Law, Haven Intensity, SPE 
Intensity, CPI, GDP, Foreignness, cash flow volatility, and sales 
volatility 2,067 11,077
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Table 2 
Sample Frequency by Industry 
 
 
Notes:  This table presents the Fama-French 30 industry composition of the sample, compared to all US 
incorporated firms in Compustat during the sample time period with at least one year of non-missing assets. The 
financial and utility industries are dropped because we eliminate regulated industries from the sample. Of the 14 
firms in Compustat in the tobacco industry, none fulfill all our sample selection criteria, so the industry is dropped 
from the table. Thus, the table has data on 27 industries. 
  
Industry Sample Firms
Pct of Sample 
Firms
Compustat 
Firms
Pct of 
Compustat 
Firms
Automobiles and Trucks 58 2.81% 173 1.36%
Beer and Liquor 5 0.24 38 0.30
Printing and Publishing 30 1.45 160 1.26
Business Equipment 438 21.19 1,650 12.98
Aircraft, Ships, and Railroad Equipment 17 0.82 76 0.60
Chemicals 80 3.87 243 1.91
Apparel 41 1.98 160 1.26
Construction 56 2.71 390 3.07
Coal 1 0.05 32 0.25
Electrical Equipment 55 2.66 183 1.44
Fabricated Products 160 7.74 452 3.56
Food Products 37 1.79 281 2.21
Recreation 42 2.03 453 3.56
Health Care 160 7.74 1,634 12.86
Consumer Goods 53 2.56 223 1.75
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 14 0.68 303 2.38
Mining 14 0.68 110 0.87
Oil 76 3.68 572 4.50
Other 64 3.10 651 5.12
Paper products 57 2.76 167 1.31
Retail 40 1.94 712 5.60
Services 375 18.14 2,258 17.77
Steel 40 1.94 165 1.30
Telecommunications 36 1.74 640 5.04
Transportation 31 1.50 341 2.68
Textiles 17 0.82 76 0.60
Wholesale 70 3.39 567 4.46
Total 2,067 100.00% 12,710 100.00%
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
Notes:  This table contains descriptive statistics for variables used in our study. The sample consists of 11,077 
observations, selected as outlined in Table 1.  PTDACC is pre-tax discretionary accruals, calculated using the 
modified Jones model using pre-tax accruals instead of total accruals.  The model is estimated separately for each 
two-digit SIC code and year for which there are at least 10 observations.  |PTDACC| is the absolute value of pre-tax 
discretionary accruals.  PIDOM is pre-tax domestic income from Compustat.  PIFO is pre-tax foreign income from 
Compustat. RULE OF LAW is the average rule of law of the countries in which the firm operates. Rule of law scores 
for each country are obtained from the World Bank Governance Indicators.   HAVEN INTENSITY is the number of 
countries in which the firm discloses a subsidiary that are tax havens divided by the total number of countries in 
which the firm discloses a subsidiary. A country is designated as tax haven if it appears on at least two of the four 
lists of tax havens found at http://www.globalpolicy.org.  We use the lists as reported on March 4, 2008 as per 
Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). SPE INTENSITY is the number of subsidiaries that are LLCs, LLPs, or Trusts divided 
by the total number of subsidiaries.  FOREIGNNESS is foreign sales from Compustat geographic segment data 
divided by total SALES from Compustat.  CASH FLOW VOLATILITY is the moving 5-year standard deviation of 
pre-tax cash flow from operations (i.e. CSHO+TXPD-XIDOC), each year running from year t-4 to year t.  SALES 
VOLATILITY is the moving 5-year standard deviation of SALES from Compustat  each year running from year t-4 to 
year t. NCOUNTRIES is the log of the total number of countries in which the firm discloses a subsidiary. SIZE is the 
log of total assets, CPI CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES is the average change in consumer price index for the countries 
in which the firm discloses material subsidiaries.  GDP CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES is the average change in GDP 
for the countries in which the firm discloses material subsidiaries. Data on CPI and GDP are gathered from the 
World Economic Outlook Database, April 2010 edition, available from the International Monetary Fund.  PTDACC, 
PIDOM, and PIFO are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year.
NAME N MEAN STD P25 P50 P75
PTDACC 11,077 0.003 0.099 -0.030 0.011 0.050
|PTDACC| 11,077 0.064 0.076 0.019 0.041 0.078
PIDOM 11,077 0.026 0.147 -0.015 0.036 0.090
PIFO 11,077 0.028 0.062 0.003 0.019 0.048
RULE OF LAW 11,077 1.065 0.487 0.780 1.087 1.406
HAVEN INTENSITY 11,077 0.177 0.179 0.038 0.146 0.250
SPE INTENSITY 11,077 0.058 0.221 0.000 0.000 0.050
FOREIGNNESS 11,077 0.381 0.224 0.208 0.358 0.519
CASH FLOW VOLATILITY 11,077 0.062 0.068 0.028 0.045 0.073
SALES VOLATILITY 11,077 0.232 0.267 0.096 0.165 0.279
NCOUNTRIES 11,077 2.348 0.919 1.609 2.398 3.045
SIZE 11,077 6.716 1.805 5.523 6.676 7.872
CPI CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES 11,077 5.205 18.087 2.113 3.003 4.586
GDP CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES 11,077 3.444 1.672 2.300 3.494 4.570
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Table 4 
Correlations  
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  This table presents the bivariate Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman (below the diagonal) correlations.  All variables are defined in Table 3.  
Sample selection criteria are in Table 1. * indicates significance at the 5% level or better.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 PTDACC -0.29* 0.51* 0.22* -0.06* -0.02 0.02* 0.02 -0.06* -0.04* 0.04* 0.06* 0.01 0.00
2 |PTDACC| 0.13* -0.33* -0.14* 0.06* 0.04* -0.01 0.01 0.29* 0.22* -0.14* -0.21* -0.03* -0.07*
3 PIDOM 0.31* -0.12* 0.14* -0.03* -0.01 0.01 -0.13* -0.14* -0.04* 0.10* 0.21* 0.02* 0.07*
4 PIFO 0.17* -0.11* 0.23* -0.11* 0.06* -0.04* 0.24* -0.01 0.02 0.20* 0.20* 0.01 0.09*
5 RULE OF LAW -0.05* 0.07* -0.00 -0.15* -0.04* -0.01 -0.11* 0.10* 0.06* -0.33* -0.27* -0.11* -0.28*
6 HAVEN INTENSITY -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.11* -0.10* -0.04* 0.08* 0.08* 0.05* 0.04* 0.05* -0.03* 0.13*
7 SPE INTENSITY 0.02* -0.05* -0.00 0.01 -0.19* 0.04* -0.10* -0.04* -0.02* -0.13* 0.05* -0.02* -0.01
8 FOREIGNNESS 0.01 -0.00 -0.21* 0.36* -0.14* 0.13* -0.08* 0.03* -0.04* 0.28* 0.05* -0.02* 0.06*
9 CASH FLOW VOLATILITY -0.07* 0.25* 0.01 -0.05* 0.16* 0.07* -0.15* 0.01 0.43* -0.20* -0.37* -0.02* 0.00
10 SALES VOLATILITY -0.02* 0.19* 0.09* -0.01 0.11* 0.01 -0.09* -0.09* 0.44* -0.11* -0.23* -0.02 0.01
11 NCOUNTRIES 0.02* -0.13* 0.08* 0.33* -0.41* 0.25* 0.14* 0.35* -0.24* -0.14* 0.55* 0.06* 0.08*
12 SIZE 0.02* -0.20* 0.17* 0.27* -0.33* 0.14* 0.31* 0.09* -0.39* -0.27* 0.56* 0.07* 0.07*
13 CPI CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES 0.04* -0.05* 0.06* 0.15* -0.64* 0.01 0.10* 0.04* -0.20* -0.10* 0.41* 0.35* 0.02*
14 GDP CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES -0.03* -0.09* 0.07* 0.11* -0.28* 0.15* 0.04* 0.06* -0.02 -0.00 0.12* 0.10* 0.06*
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Table 5 
Discretionary Accruals as a Function of Rule of Law, Tax Haven Intensity, and Controls 
 
Panel A: Full Sample – Profit and Loss Firm-years 
 
 
 Notes: This table presents estimates from Equation (3):  𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐻𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑁 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸 𝑂𝐹 𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 + ∑𝛼𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 . Each of the variables shown in the table is defined in Table 3. T-
statistics, shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates, are based on standard errors that are clustered by 
firm and year. One tailed tests of significance are used where a signed prediction has been made. ***, **, and * 
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Prediction
INTERCEPT 4.024***        2.760***        4.027***        
(7.97) (7.96) (7.99)
RULE OF LAW ( - ) -0.687***      -0.688***      
(-3.89) (-3.90)
HAVEN INTENSITY ( + ) -0.104      -0.127      
(-0.34) (-0.40)
SPE INTENSITY 0.699***        0.745***        0.697***        
(3.03) (3.00) (3.02)
FOREIGNNESS 0.287        0.300        0.295        
(0.77) (0.79) (0.79)
NCOUNTRIES 0.061        0.151        0.060        
(0.72) (1.69) (0.72)
SIZE -0.131***      -0.111**      -0.130**      
(-3.00) (-2.50) (-2.95)
CPI CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES -0.002      -0.001      -0.002      
(-1.48) (-1.06) (-1.49)
GDP CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES -0.247**      -0.191*      -0.246**      
(-2.54) (-2.09) (-2.52)
SALES VOLATILITY -0.253      -0.261      -0.250      
(-0.75) (-0.76) (-0.74)
CASH FLOW VOLATILITY -10.659***    -10.916***    -10.603***    
(-6.86) (-7.09) (-6.87)
N 11,077 11,077 11,077
ADJRSQ 0.019        0.016        0.019        
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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Table 5 (continued) 
Discretionary Accruals as a Function of Rule of Law, Tax Haven Intensity, and Controls  
 
Panel B: Sub-sample of Firm-Years with Positive Pre-tax Domestic Income and Positive Pre-tax 
Foreign Income 
 
 
Notes: This table presents estimates from Equation (3): 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐻𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑁 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸 𝑂𝐹 𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 + ∑𝛼𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 . Only observations with positive domestic and foreign pre-tax 
incomes are included. Each of the variables shown in the table is defined in Table 3. T-statistics, shown in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates, are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm and year. One 
tailed tests of significance are used where a signed prediction has been made. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Prediction
INTERCEPT 7.168***        5.329***        7.170***        
(7.59) (9.20) (7.65)
RULE OF LAW ( - ) -0.980***      -0.981***      
(-3.62) (-3.61)
HAVEN INTENSITY ( + ) 0.828**        0.836**        
(1.87) (1.89)
SPE INTENSITY 1.371***        1.608***        1.373***        
(4.17) (4.16) (4.17)
FOREIGNNESS 2.314***        2.157***        2.259***        
(5.52) (5.18) (5.36)
NCOUNTRIES -0.261**      -0.089      -0.255**      
(-2.59) (-0.96) (-2.53)
SIZE -0.311***      -0.301***      -0.322***      
(-5.88) (-5.74) (-6.09)
CPI CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES -0.006**      -0.004**      -0.006**      
(-2.46) (-2.78) (-2.39)
GDP CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES -0.362**      -0.292**      -0.372**      
(-2.66) (-2.35) (-2.75)
SALES VOLATILITY 0.543        0.442        0.495        
(1.14) (0.93) (1.03)
CASH FLOW VOLATILITY -19.339***    -19.798***    -19.647***    
(-7.86) (-8.18) (-8.12)
N 6,529 6,529 6,529
ADJRSQ 0.060        0.053        0.061        
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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Table 6 
Discretionary Accruals on Domestic Pre-tax Income and Pre-tax Foreign Income and 
Interacted Effects 
 
Panel A: Full Sample – Profit and Loss Firm-years 
 
 Notes: This table presents estimates from Equation (11): 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝜋0𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋1𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸 𝑂𝐹 𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋2𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑁 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜋𝑘𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑘 + 𝜔0𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 +
𝜔1𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸 𝑂𝐹 𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔2𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑁 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜔𝑘𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑘 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡. Each of 
the variables shown in the table is defined in Table 3. T-statistics, shown in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates, are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm and year. One tailed tests of significance are used 
where a signed prediction has been made. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
INTERCEPT -0.275***      -0.528***      -0.458***      -0.517***      -0.441***      
(-4.87) (-8.71) (-7.63) (-8.54) (-7.35)
PIDOM ( + ) 22.031***     27.278***     27.929***     27.374***     27.758***     
(42.97) (47.96) (50.36) (48.25) (50.26)
PIFO ( + ) 14.817***     19.078***     18.758***     19.001***     18.867***     
(15.62) (15.76) (15.37) (15.58) (15.44)
PIDOM*RULE OF LAW -8.111***      -8.582***      
(-8.64) (-9.28)
PIFO*RULE OF LAW ( - ) -20.788***   -20.872***   
(-10.78) (-10.71)
PIDOM*HAVEN INTENSITY 10.558***     12.161***     
(4.25) (5.30)
PIFO*HAVEN INTENSITY ( + ) -4.357      -2.588      
(-0.93) (-0.57)
CONTROLS NO YES YES YES YES
N 11,077 11,077 11,077 11,077 11,077
ADJRSQ 0.214       0.312       0.340       0.322       0.347       
PIDOM-PIFO 7.215***       8.200***       9.172***       8.373***       8.891***       
(6.36) (5.71) (6.37) (5.79) (6.18)
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Table 6 (continued) 
Discretionary Accruals on Domestic Pre-tax Income and Pre-tax Foreign Income and 
Interacted Effects 
 
Panel B: Sub-sample of Firm-Years with Positive Pre-tax Domestic Income and Positive Pre-tax 
Foreign Income 
 
 
Notes: This table presents estimates from Equation (11): 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝜋0𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋1𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸 𝑂𝐹 𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋2𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑁 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜋𝑘𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑘 + 𝜔0𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 +
𝜔1𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸 𝑂𝐹 𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔2𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑁 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜔𝑘𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑘 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡. Only 
observations with positive foreign and domestic pre-tax incomes are included in the tests. Each of the variables 
shown in the table is defined in Table 3. T-statistics, shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates, are based 
on standard errors that are clustered by firm and year. One tailed tests of significance are used where a signed 
prediction has been made. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.
Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
INTERCEPT 1.420***       0.793***       0.742***       0.801***       0.762***       
(15.23) (7.73) (7.20) (7.81) (7.40)
PIDOM ( + ) 5.517***       13.060***     14.207***     13.120***     14.231***     
(6.80) (14.60) (15.81) (14.66) (15.80)
PIFO ( + ) 4.984***       8.197***       8.779***       7.685***       8.011***       
(4.12) (4.70) (4.96) (4.43) (4.56)
PIDOM*RULE OF LAW -3.915***     -3.756***     
(-2.78) (-2.64)
PIFO*RULE OF LAW ( - ) -17.132***   -18.974***   
(-7.13) (-7.36)
PIDOM*HAVEN INTENSITY -5.471*     -3.458     
(-1.57) (-0.97)
PIFO*HAVEN INTENSITY ( + ) 19.885***     19.479***     
(2.98) (2.93)
CONTROLS NO YES YES YES YES
N 6,529 6,529 6,529 6,529 6,529
ADJRSQ 0.010       0.115       0.143       0.115       0.144       
PIDOM-PIFO 0.533       4.863***       5.428***       5.435***       6.220***       
(0.36) (2.41) (2.67) (2.71) (3.08)
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Table 7 
Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals as a Function of Rule of Law, Tax Haven 
Intensity, and Controls 
 
 
Notes: This table presents estimates from the following model: |𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶|𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐻𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑁 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸 𝑂𝐹 𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 + ∑𝛼𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 . Each of the variables shown in the table is defined in Table 3. T-
statistics, shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates, are based on standard errors that are clustered by 
firm and year. One tailed tests of significance are used where a signed prediction has been made. ***, **, and * 
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Prediction
INTERCEPT 5.664***        5.098***        5.657***        
(11.90) (17.18) (11.97)
RULE OF LAW ( - ) -0.306**      -0.306**      
(-2.20) (-2.14)
HAVEN INTENSITY ( + ) 0.649***        0.649***        
(3.83) (3.61)
SPE INTENSITY 0.223*        0.255***        0.236**        
(1.69) (1.86) (1.82)
FOREIGNNESS 0.419***        0.383**        0.380**        
(3.22) (2.92) (2.92)
NCOUNTRIES -0.079*      -0.038      -0.078*      
(-2.12) (-1.06) (-2.11)
SIZE -0.190***      -0.188***      -0.197***      
(-8.83) (-8.55) (-8.98)
CPI CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES -0.002**      -0.001      -0.001*      
(-2.37) (-0.83) (-1.97)
GDP CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES -0.190**      -0.173**      -0.198**      
(-2.82) (-2.84) (-2.95)
SALES VOLATILITY 1.406***        1.388***        1.399***        
(6.85) (6.67) (6.70)
CASH FLOW VOLATILITY 11.276***      10.845***      10.948***      
(11.26) (10.64) (10.77)
N 11,077 11,077 11,077
ADJRSQ 0.097        0.096        0.098        
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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Table 8 
Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals on Pre-tax Domestic Income and Pre-tax Foreign 
Income and Interacted Effects 
 
 
Notes:  This table presents estimates from the following model: |𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶|𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝜋0|𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀|𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋1|𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀|𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸 𝑂𝐹 𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋2|𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀|𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑁 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜋𝑘|𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑂𝑀|𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑘 + 𝜔0|𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂|𝑖𝑡 +
𝜔1|𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂|𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸 𝑂𝐹 𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔2|𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂|𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑁 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜔𝑘|𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑂|𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑘 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 . Each 
of the variables shown in the table is defined in Table 3. T-statistics, shown in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates, are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm and year. One tailed tests of significance are used 
where a signed prediction has been made. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
INTERCEPT 3.407***       3.625***       3.579***       3.592***       3.584***       
(78.01) (70.25) (69.73) (70.03) (69.92)
|PIDOM| ( + ) 8.913***       6.984***       7.776***       7.624***       7.853***       
(21.53) (14.13) (15.88) (15.55) (16.03)
|PIFO| ( + ) 4.215***       4.363***       4.723***       4.080***       4.309***       
(7.13) (4.81) (5.20) (4.47) (4.77)
|PIDOM|*RULE OF LAW -0.821     -0.876     
(-1.11) (-1.17)
|PIFO|*RULE OF LAW ( - ) -5.956***     -7.090***     
(-4.35) (-5.24)
|PIDOM|*HAVEN INTENSITY 1.275       1.437       
(0.78) (0.90)
|PIFO|*HAVEN INTENSITY ( + ) 10.759***     13.998***     
(3.52) (4.55)
CONTROLS NO YES YES YES YES
N 11,077 11,077 11,077 11,077 11,077
ADJRSQ 0.057       0.155       0.147       0.148       0.151       
PIDOM-PIFO 4.699***       2.620***       3.053***       3.543***       3.545***       
(6.10) (2.46) (2.88) (3.33) (3.36)
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Table 9 
Restatement Firm-years as a Function of Rule of Law, Tax Haven Intensity, and Controls 
 
 
 
Notes: This table presents results from a logistic regression where the dependent variable is one for firm-years where 
financial statements were restated. The independent variables shown in the table are described in Table 3. Additional 
control variables are included, but not presented (see footnote 22). Chi-square statistics, shown in parentheses below 
the coefficient estimates, are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm and year. ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Prediction
INTERCEPT -3.251***                           
(17.78)
RULE OF LAW ( - ) -0.591**                           
(6.29)
HAVEN INTENSITY ( + ) -0.094                           
(0.02)
SPE INTENSITY 0.923***                            
(13.59)
FOREIGNNESS 0.715*                            
(3.76)
NCOUNTRIES 0.156                            
(1.28)
SIZE 0.075                            
(1.22)
CPI CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES -0.123***                           
(6.98)
GDP CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES -0.104                           
(1.57)
SALES VOLATILITY 0.769***                            
(7.68)
CASH FLOW VOLATILITY -1.830                           
(1.45)
Additional Controls
N 6,699
Pseudo RSQ 0.012                            
Restatement Year
Yes
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Table 10 
Propensity Score Test of Rule of Law on Restatements 
 
Panel A: Frequency of Restatement Firm-years Across Strong and Weak RULE OF LAW 
 
 
Notes: This table shows the frequency of restatement of firm-years in weak RULE OF LAW countries relative to a 
matched sample of firm-years in strong RULE OF LAW countries. Firm-years are matched based on their propensity 
to have weak RULE OF LAW – defined as being in the lowest quintile of RULE OF LAW. Control firm-years are 
drawn from the highest two quintiles of RULE OF LAW.  
 
  
Strong RULE OF LAW Weak RULE OF LAW
Did not Restate 1,050 1,005
Restated 12 57
Total 1,062 1,062
Chi-Square 30.330
Prob Chi-Square = 0 <.0001
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Table 10 (continued) 
Propensity Score Test of Rule of Law on Restatements 
 
Panel B: Test of the Propensity Score Match Quality 
 
Notes: This table evaluates the effectiveness of the matches pre-match versus post-match. The first row of each 
variable shows the mean value before matches have been assigned, and the right two columns test whether treatment 
and control samples are different. The second row repeats the exercise after the matches are made. 
 
  
Weak RULE 
OF LAW
Strong RULE 
OF LAW T Prob T
RULE OF LAW Pre-match 0.372 1.503 -123.16 0.000
RULE OF LAW Post-match 0.372 1.371 - 90.10 0.000
HAVEN INTENSITY Pre-match 0.203 0.167 5.27 0.000
HAVEN INTENSITY Post-match 0.203 0.198 0.58 0.561
SPE INTENSITY Pre-match 0.055 0.040 2.48 0.013
SPE INTENSITY Post-match 0.055 0.068 - 1.05 0.294
FOREIGNNESS Pre-match 0.376 0.339 4.77 0.000
FOREIGNNESS Post-match 0.376 0.393 - 1.81 0.070
NCOUNTRIES Pre-match 2.643 1.975 20.26 0.000
NCOUNTRIES Post-match 2.643 2.502 3.44 0.001
SIZE Pre-match 7.636 6.324 22.01 0.000
SIZE Post-match 7.636 7.438 2.83 0.005
CPI CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES Pre-match 7.994 2.371 30.79 0.000
CPI CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES Post-match 7.994 7.382 2.06 0.040
GDP CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES Pre-match 3.759 3.003 13.10 0.000
GDP CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES Post-match 3.759 3.589 2.30 0.022
SALES VOLATILITY Pre-match 0.198 0.250 - 6.47 0.000
SALES VOLATILITY Post-match 0.198 0.190 0.98 0.325
CASH FLOW VOLATILITY Pre-match 0.049 0.066 - 8.41 0.000
CASH FLOW VOLATILITY Post-match 0.049 0.046 2.23 0.026
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Table 11 
Propensity Score Test of Haven Intensity on Restatements 
 
Panel A: Frequency of Restatement Firm-years Across Strong and Weak HAVEN INTENSITY 
 
 Notes: This table shows the frequency of restatement of firm-years with weak HAVEN INTENSITY relative to a 
matched sample of firm-years with strong HAVEN INTENSITY. Firm-years are matched based on their propensity to 
have weak HAVEN INTENSITY – defined as being in the lowest quintile of HAVEN INTENSITY. Control firm-years 
are drawn from the highest two quintiles of HAVEN INTENSITY.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Strong HAVEN INTENSITY Weak HAVEN INTENSITY
Did not Restate 1,335 1,318
Restated 45 62
Total 1,380 1,380
Chi-Square 2.490
Prob Chi-Square = 0 0.115
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Table 11 (continued) 
Propensity Score Test of Haven Intensity on Restatements 
 
Panel B: Test of the Propensity Score Match Quality  
 
 
Notes: This table evaluates the effectiveness of the matches pre-match vs post-match. The first row of each variable 
shows the mean value before matches are assigned, and the right two columns test whether treatment and control 
samples are different. The second row repeats the exercise after the matches are made. 
Strong 
HAVEN 
INTENSITY
Weak 
HAVEN 
INTENSITY T Prob T
HAVEN INTENSITY Pre-match 0.453 0.032 117.88 0.000
HAVEN INTENSITY Post-match 0.453 0.038 81.95 0.000
RULE OF LAW Pre-match 1.073 1.157 - 4.88 0.000
RULE OF LAW Post-match 1.073 1.033 1.91 0.056
SPE INTENSITY Pre-match 0.037 0.048 - 2.17 0.030
SPE INTENSITY Post-match 0.037 0.046 - 1.62 0.105
FOREIGNNESS Pre-match 0.368 0.328 5.70 0.000
FOREIGNNESS Post-match 0.368 0.376 - 0.94 0.348
NCOUNTRIES Pre-match 2.099 1.943 5.54 0.000
NCOUNTRIES Post-match 2.643 2.130 - 0.94 0.347
SIZE Pre-match 6.388 6.263 2.11 0.000
SIZE Post-match 6.388 6.437 - 0.70 0.005
CPI CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES Pre-match 3.697 4.040 - 3.79 0.000
CPI CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES Post-match 3.697 3.954 - 1.33 0.040
GDP CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES Pre-match 3.607 3.136 8.82 0.000
GDP CHANGE SUB COUNTRIES Post-match 3.607 3.628 - 0.31 0.022
SALES VOLATILITY Pre-match 0.286 0.225 3.86 0.000
SALES VOLATILITY Post-match 0.286 0.281 0.34 0.325
CASH FLOW VOLATILITY Pre-match 0.075 0.063 5.24 0.000
CASH FLOW VOLATILITY Post-match 0.075 0.072 1.11 0.265
MEAN T-TEST
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Figure 1 
Plot of the Effect of RULE OF LAW and HAVEN INTENSITY on Discretionary Accruals 
(PTDACC) 
 
 
 
Notes:  This figure presents estimates of the effect of RULE OF LAW and HAVEN INTENSITY on discretionary 
accruals (PTDACC) when both foreign and domestic pre-tax earnings are positive.  The estimates are obtained by 
estimating Equation (3), except replacing the continuous measures of RULE OF LAW (HAVEN INTENSITY) with 5 
indicator variables based on quintiles of RULE OF LAW (HAVEN INTENSITY). To show the incremental effect, the 
baseline is centered on zero. 
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Figure 2 
Plot of the Effect of RULE OF LAW and HAVEN INTENSITY on the Mapping of Pre-tax 
Income from Foreign Operations (PIFO) into Discretionary Accruals (PTDACC) 
 
 
 
Notes:  This figure presents estimates of the effect of RULE OF LAW and HAVEN INTENSITY on the mapping of 
pre-tax income from foreign operations PIFO into discretionary accruals (PTDACC) when both foreign and 
domestic pre-tax earnings are positive.  The estimates are obtained by estimating Equation (11), except replacing the 
continuous measures of RULE OF LAW (HAVEN INTENSITY) with 5 indicator variables based on quintiles of 
RULE OF LAW (HAVEN INTENSITY). To show the incremental effect, the baseline is centered on zero. 
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